

US Hegemony and Multilateralism: The Case of Asia Pacific Regional Security

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Introduction

This paper attempts to explain one of the underlying forces that led to the phenomenal growth of regionalism in the Asia Pacific. Specifically, it looks into the relationship between US hegemony and the evolving regional security system.¹ This paper argues that there is an inverse relationship between American hegemony and the rise of multilateralism, i.e., the coordination among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct,² in the Asia Pacific region. An extreme form of US hegemony in the Cold War era undermined efforts toward multilateralism. However, recent multilateral efforts to address security matters were a result of the decline in extreme preponderance of the United States (US) in the Asia Pacific. Therefore, this paper seeks to address the extent to which the decline of hegemony affects the preference of the hegemon itself and regional states to pursue a multilateral rather than a bilateral arrangement in managing regional security.

Hegemony and Multilateralism: A Theoretical Framework

The end of the Cold War has considerably lessened the integrating dynamics, and increased the discontinuity between the global and regional systems. This phenomenon has renewed the interest in regional approaches, specifically multilateral approaches, to security problems. For instance, Barry Buzan argues that the removal of the overlay of the old geopolitics has "encouraged multipolarity and contributed to an international system in which regional arrangements can be expected to assume greater importance."³ Likewise, the United Nations (UN) recognizes the potential role regional multilateral arrangements could play in the changed global order. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali contends that "regional arrangements and agencies in many cases possess a potential that

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should be utilized in serving the functions of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding.”⁴ He further mentions that “regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the United Nations could lighten the burden of the [Security Council], but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.”⁵

In spite of this renewed optimism over regional multilateral approach to security, its place and role in instituting a stable regional order is still evolving. In the meantime, a few basic questions demand theoretical clarification. What drives regional states to cooperate by way of multilateralism? What factors are likely to undermine the creation and/or success of regionalized multilateralism? What is the relationship between hegemony and multilateral efforts?

Although there exists a vast amount of literature on the general relationship between hegemony and economic cooperation,⁶ the linkage between hegemony and security cooperation, particularly hegemony and regional security multilateralism, remains undertheorized. Consequently, most of the explanations on why states cooperate in addressing security concerns are extrapolated from theories of economic cooperation. For instance, Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrode argue that a single framework of analysis can throw light on both political-economic and security relationships.⁷ Keohane and Nye define hegemony as “a situation in which one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so.”⁸ Robert Gilpin adds that a hegemon must also be capable of extracting contribution toward the maintenance of these rules.⁹ But the concept of hegemony is also understood as the “willingness of the partners of a hegemon to defer to the hegemonial leadership.” In other words, hegemony is rooted in “the awareness by elites in subordinate states that they are benefiting, as well as the willingness of the hegemon itself to sacrifice tangible short-term benefits for intangible longer-term gains.”¹⁰

From the perspective of early hegemonic stability theory, two major assumptions account for the relationship between hegemony and cooperation. The first assumption, as elaborated by Keohane’s earlier work, is that “order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power.”¹¹ This implies that formation of international cooperation or regimes normally depends on hegemony. The second assumption, forwarded by Charles Kindleberger, is that “for the world economy to be stable, it needs a stabilizer.”¹² This also means that maintaining cooperation requires continued hegemony. Under each assumption, the decline of hegemonic power is problematic for cooperation, international regimes in

particular. As Gilpin cites, the decline of international leadership of the US, which has already been evident as early as a decade ago, "seriously undermined the stable political framework that sustained the expansion of liberal world economy in the postwar era."¹³ However, Keohane, in *After Hegemony*, later argues that cooperation may continue even if the preponderant state experiences relative decline. This is possible because of the inertia of existing regimes, the presence of specific shared interests, and the willingness of the declining hegemon to lead. But Keohane does not suggest that it is possible for a regime to arise "after hegemony."

But how does one explain the regional security structure of the Asia Pacific region in the Cold War era, where there was an absence of successful multilateralism and conspicuous preponderance of the US? What about the phenomenal increase in security dialogue processes, and subsequently, the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in the midst of serious questions on the predominance of the US in the Asia Pacific region after the Cold War period? In answering these puzzles of Asia Pacific regionalism, the incentives and preferences of both the hegemon and regional states are taken into consideration.

According to Arthur Stein, the outcome of the interaction of states is a function of their interests and ordering of preferences, which in turn are determined by the degree of power distribution in the international system. Donald Crone further notes in his study of Asia Pacific economic cooperation that, although highly asymmetric patterns of relations, or dependence, and symmetric or balanced patterns of relations are similar in analytic properties, they differ in the way they shape states' incentives. Therefore, if there exists a vast disparity between the hegemon and subordinate actors, the former finds no incentive to eschew independent decision-making. Relying on its superior relational power, the hegemon is disposed to impose or dictate order as a way of achieving its most preferred or the optimal outcome in relation to other states. The creation of a regime or multilateral arrangement which would entail tedious bargaining and coordination with more states is no longer seen as necessary. The superior state then prefers to obtain a bilateral rather than a multilateral arrangement. Briefly put, high asymmetry of power leaves a preponderant state with few incentives to pursue coordinated decision-making or multilateralism.

Similarly, asymmetry of power relations molds other actors' incentives and preferences. In a bilateral set-up, for as long as subordinate actors share with the hegemon the most preferred outcome, there is no reason to create a regime.

They may prefer to “exploit whatever individual advantages they can muster, to free-ride, or to pursue tactics of dependence” in a bilateral arrangement rather than to pursue a “general order within which they clearly have little voice.”

The incentives to change the form of engagement among states may however begin as differences in power distribution (either real or mere perceptions) narrow. When this context of interaction leads to an undesirable or suboptimal outcome or complete uncertainty, the hegemon may prefer to move from an independent to a joint, coordinated and balanced decision-making. In particular, the inability to sustain extreme hegemony may well press the preponderant state toward the “creation of a common institution to pursue its interests, to share burdens, to solve common problems, and to generate international support and legitimacy for its policies.” Although, it may allow concessions to subordinate states, the declining hegemon would still use its size to preserve its bargaining power, and would seldom make concessions on its own initiatives. Likewise, a suboptimal outcome of regional states’ relation with the hegemon offers them the incentive to shift from dependence to cooperative strategy. Multilateralism becomes an attractive alternative arrangement not only because of the perception that the declining hegemon is no longer solely capable of sustaining order at a most preferred level but also because they want to keep a large actor in the system as well as to constrain exercise of its unilateral power. Stein says that the decision of both the hegemon and secondary states to engage in a mutual cooperation is necessary to achieve an optimal outcome.

In brief, this theoretical framework, contrary to the assumptions of the hegemonic stability theory, contends that the erosion of extreme hegemony provides the political environment favorable for multilateralism. As hegemony declines, although it remains dominant in the region, the incentives for all actors to cooperate via multilateralism may change. This framework may well explain the absence of institutionalized multilateralism in the Cold War, and the recent attempts toward such an arrangement to manage the security of the Asia Pacific region.

American Preponderance and the Asia Pacific Security System in the Cold War Era

Unlike the Atlantic region, the Asia Pacific exhibited no evidence of successful multilateralism both in the fields of political economy and security in the Cold War era. There were proposals and attempts to create pan-Pacific security organizations, but all failed to materialize. In order to understand such a pattern, it is instructive to analyze the distribution of power in the Asia Pacific,

and the incentives and preferences its states have that discouraged them from engaging beyond bilateralism in the Cold War era.

Driven by its huge economic and strategic interests, the US among all states projected the strongest presence in the Asia Pacific region in the Cold War era. It has maintained several major military installations and deployed military forces in various points of the region for a ready, quick and flexible reaction capability to contingencies in Asia. Its extremely powerful position in the international and regional systems gave the US an immense leverage to dictate arrangements that were most beneficial for its national interests. These arrangements included bilateral relations with Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, and a unilaterally initiated decision on Taiwan (i.e., the Taiwan Relations Act).

Not only the capability and the willingness of the US to provide for security guarantees but also the willingness of regional states to accept such provision made bilateralism a rule in Asia Pacific regional politics. Thus, instead of going through a tedious multilateral bargaining process, regional states remained aloof from one another, and committed themselves to their own internal economic development under the security umbrella of the US. Consequently, inculcated was a dependence on the US by regional states, and the absence of any real advancement toward multilateral security initiatives in the region. Two cases of possible venues for regional multilateral cooperation in the Cold War era, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), could illustrate this linkage between extreme American hegemony and multilateralism.

Although meant to become a collective security organization, SEATO did not progress successfully from bilateral relations between the US and each member-state. Because every member-state held different perceptions of what constituted an external threat, collective action was an inadequate mechanism to respond to their varying security predicaments. Instead, members tried to muster whatever gains they could obtain from bilateral relations they had previously forged with the US, or to free-ride on the security umbrella provided for by the US. To put it briefly, SEATO became defunct before it even began as a collective security organization.

Another case in point is the ASEAN. Although it is often noted as the most successful regional organization in the developing world, its effectiveness in overcoming the challenges of the Cold War is not rooted in multilateralism.

ASEAN approached security not in a multilateral manner. In order to ensure stability and nonsusceptibility to possible encroachment by major powers, ASEAN members opted to insulate themselves from the dynamics of regional politics, which was fundamentally determined by the interplay of the US, USSR and China. To this end, they pushed for a policy of national resilience or self-reliance. National resilience is fundamentally “an inward-looking concept based on the proposition that national security lies not in military alliances or under the defense umbrella of a greater power, but in social development, political stability, and a sense of nationalism” by individual member-states. From this national resilience stems regional resilience, from the sum total of every ASEAN member’s national resilience.” In effect, the very foundation of ASEAN as an institution is never meant to be multilateral in nature.

Consistent with the policy of national resilience, member-states refused to transform ASEAN into a military alliance, or to be perceived as one. Two factors could also account for this reluctance. The first was that the formation of a security organization was not possible because of the absence of a common perception of external threats. The second was the fear of provoking intervention from the alliance between Vietnam and the USSR. Thus, in lieu of a multilateral security arrangement, member-states forged a web of interlocking bilateral defense arrangements with each other. These undoubtedly contributed to intra-ASEAN transparency, confidence-building measures (CBMs), and close personal ties among security personnel at the highest levels.

There were efforts to undertake multilateral initiatives under the aegis of the Association. These included dialogue and consultation processes through the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting (ASEAN-PMC) and the ASEAN High Council. The latter’s agenda was mainly on economic matters. Only on three political issues — the war in Afghanistan, the Cambodian problem and Vietnamese refugees — was the ASEAN-PMC actually involved. Meanwhile, the High Council was provided for by the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The Council could have served as a forum for conflict resolution in Southeast Asia, but it has never been constituted as such.

Moreover, the ASEAN’s proposal for the creation of a Southeast Asian Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) could have also been a catalyst in institutionalizing multilateralism at a subregional level. However, due to their vulnerability to the politics of major powers, ASEAN members’ dependence on the US security umbrella prevailed more than their desire for nonalignment. For instance, the Philippines and Thailand preferred to remain bound by their mutual

defense treaties with the US. Singapore also feared that the neutrality proposal could lead to a premature American disengagement from the region, thus inviting the rise of a regional hegemon. Indonesia, despite its strong advocacy for neutrality, saw the US as balancer against a perceived long-term threat from China.¹⁴

The past dynamics of ASEAN involvement in security matters clearly illustrate the absence of multilateralism in Southeast Asia. As discussed, ASEAN's ability to provide for its members' security resulted from interlocking bilateral relations within it, and their ability to insulate themselves from major powers' encroachment. However, the latter was possible only because they opted to rely on the security umbrella provided by the hegemon.

Hegemonic Decline and the Rise of Multilateralism in the Post-Cold War Asia Pacific Region

Security issues have taken various forms and shapes in the post-Cold War era. In the Asia Pacific region, states have to reckon with both conventional and nonconventional security concerns. These include the uncertain regional balance of forces, territorial and maritime boundary problems, nuclear and conventional arms proliferation, drug trafficking, migration, terrorism, piracy, and others. The impact of the emergence of these multitude of issues further bares the uncertainty of regional politics and the necessity of a new approach to Asia Pacific security.

While newer threats come to the fore, there are serious questions on the prominence of the US as a preponderant force and its security commitments to the Asia Pacific region. The strong public clamor to attend to its domestic economy and the dramatic reduction in its perceptions of the threat posed by the Soviet Union led the US to reconsider its defense policies toward the Asia Pacific region. Thus, in addition to the termination of its basing rights in the Philippines, the US under the East Asia Security Initiative (EASI), was to reduce its deployed forces from 135,000 to 120,000 from 1990 to 1999.¹⁵ But as indicated in the 1995 United States Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region, the force structure since 1994 has been held at 100,000 troops.¹⁶ In addition to the decision to scale down military forces, President Bill Clinton also called for American Asian allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defense.¹⁷ Hence, Japan spends about \$5 billion annually as host to the US forces, and South Korea provides support to US Forces in Korea (USFK) through direct and indirect means.¹⁸

The decline of hegemony lies not only in the decrease of the absolute size of the US military presence, but also in the relative increase of regional states' defense capability and their perception that the US would be less able and willing to remain as the prime architect of regional security order. Japan, despite its sustained key interest in the strong presence of the US in the Asia Pacific, is trying to assume an independent regional role.¹⁹ It is also in the process of acquiring sophisticated military capability that might be used in the long run to guarantee the security of sea lanes of communication in Southeast Asia. In regional terms, Japan already has a very substantial and modern naval force, including some 100 maritime combat aircraft, 64 major surface combatants (six destroyers and 58 frigates) and 14 submarines.²⁰ The Self-Defense Forces already has the capability to deploy its forces, and has indeed deployed them as far as 1,000 miles away from its main islands, almost reaching the Philippine territory.²¹ Japan's defense budget is also increasing at a rate of three percent per annum. The justifications cited for this increase are China's and North Korea's rising military budget, and the unresolved dispute with Russia over Kurile islands.²²

In addition to the rise of Japan as a potential regional power is the resurgence of China. Spurred by sustained double-digit economic growth, China has been trying to acquire modern military technology, including a new class of destroyers, upgraded versions of the *Luda* class destroyers, a new class of missile frigates, and new classes of resupply and amphibious assault ships for sustaining operations further from shore and for longer periods.²³ China is expected to become the world's largest military in terms of structure and capability if it sustains its growth in the next decades.

Military modernization is also underway in Taiwan, and North and South Korea and most of Southeast Asian states. If this trend continues, the Asia Pacific will witness a growing concentration of heavily armed forces equipped with modern technology in the coming decades.

Furthermore, the affirmation by the US of its one-China policy has engendered doubts on American regional allies about US commitment to Taiwan's defense. Although the US sent forces during the in early 1996 China-Taiwan crisis brought about by the missile testing off Taiwan Strait, the question whether or not the US would be willing to use force in case an open conflict breaks up remains. Likewise, Washington has avoided any form of involvement in the resolution of the South China Sea dispute. Indeed, Southeast Asian leaders fear that the US may eventually lose interest in the region because of its declining

resources, coupled with strained relations with ASEAN (arising from human rights, trade gaps, etc.).²⁴

These developments in the Asia Pacific region have shaped the incentives for regional states and the US to move from asymmetrical bilateralism to cooperative multilateralism. To recall, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans first proposed the creation of a Conference on Security Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), "a future Asian security architecture involving a wholly institutional process that might be capable of evolving in Asia, just as in Europe, as framework for addressing and resolving security problems."²⁵ This proposal was dropped on the grounds of acknowledged differences between Europe and Asia. But the need for confidence-building measures gained currency.

Within ASEAN, member-states were skeptical about the idea of a pan-Pacific CSCE-like institution. In general, members of the Association argued that the Asia Pacific region is too diverse for a single institution, and that a formation of a regional organization led by regional and external states may lead ASEAN to lose its identity. Indeed ASEAN's response echoed that of the Bush Administration which dubbed the proposal as a "solution in search for a problem".²⁶ Former US President George Bush was averse to any form of multilateralism because it might undermine the bilateral engagements of the US by weakening its bargaining power. His administration's official policy was couched in these words: "While the United States would adjust the form of its security role in the region, it intends to retain the substance of its role and the bilateral defense relationships which give it structure."²⁷ Note that caution in US engagement was also due to the euphoria over the victory of US-led UN contingent against Iraq, which was interpreted as the global reassertion and success of US hegemony.

Later, the ASEAN member-states, with the support of Japan,²⁸ proposed the use of a more flexible and more consultative mechanism for promoting an exchange of views on security within the region. That alternative was the ASEAN-PMC. Cited were some advantages of the ASEAN-PMC as a security forum: (1) it has experienced discussing political issues in the past, albeit limited only to the Afghanistan War, the Cambodian problem, and the question of Vietnamese refugees; (2) it is acceptable to all members of the ASEAN; (3) it is inclusive in membership; and (4) it can make use of track-two diplomacy to support the forum.²⁹ By 1993, in addition to Japan, US, South Korea and China expressed support — but with different degrees of enthusiasm — to the ASEAN initiative. Japan promised to "develop a long-term vision regarding the future order of peace and security in the region."³⁰

As regards the US, a shift to multilateralism was noted in March 1993. Winston Lord, the new assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, signaled a willingness of the US to participate in multilateral fora.³¹ This was later followed by President Clinton's call for a new regional security dialogue during his visit to North Korea in 1993. He officially endorsed the ASEAN-PMC as an immediate opportunity to further such dialogue. President Clinton, unlike former President Bush saw multilateralism as supplementary to US alliances and strategy of forward military presence. He posited that a multilateral approach to security in the Asia-Pacific can "ensure that the end of the Cold War does not provide an opening for regional rivalry, chaos and arms race."³² Arguably, this shift in policy is to a large extent a function of the inability of the US to sustain an extremely strong presence in different regions which is in turn caused by domestic pressure, and President Clinton's inability to forge a coherent foreign policy for his administration.

The result of the above-mentioned proposals in drafting the security agenda of the Asia Pacific was the formation of the ARF in 1993. Its first meeting was held in July 1994, and was participated in by ASEAN members, their seven dialogue partners, plus China and Russia and three observers — Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea. In 1996, the ARF has widened to include India, Cambodia, and Myanmar. The participants agreed during the first meeting that the ARF would be a "high-level consultative forum that can make significant contributions to efforts toward confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region."³³ They also endorsed the ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation." However, it remains debatable whether or not this treaty could serve as backbone of the forum.

The willingness of states to engage themselves in a multilateral arrangement via the ARF is a fundamental shift in the Asia Pacific security perspective. The ARF signifies an inclusive approach to security, whereby states with varying ideologies and capabilities coordinate to solve "common aversions" and "common dilemmas" arising from a broadened concept of security. In addition, the ARF limits itself not only to the possible contribution of coordinated states' actions but also the contribution of track-two diplomacy. Track two diplomacy is a meeting of experts from the academic, governmental, official, non-governmental, and private communities to "converse about issues of common concerns."³⁴

Thus far, the ARF has begun exploring several possibilities for confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy, cooperative security ventures on various issues such as the Korea divide, the South China Sea conflict, transnational pollution, arms proliferation among others, and task force meetings and senior official meetings at different levels. Even the road map which the ARF is going to take has already been delved into. The result is an evolutionary method, i.e., from confidence-building and preventive diplomacy to the elaboration of approaches to the conflict.³⁵

Conclusion

As argued earlier, the inability of the US to sustain its extreme preponderance and also its perceived reluctance to provide for security guarantees in the Asia Pacific opened the space for both the superpower and the regional states to consider moving from an asymmetric and dependent bilateralism to a cooperative interaction through multilateralism. This linkage between hegemony and multilateralism is likely to have implications on the future of the Asia Pacific regional security architecture. If the US would remain more inward-looking, or perceived as a declining hegemon that is less capable or unwilling to provide for the collective good, then multilateralism is likely to be viewed as a more practical approach to maintaining regional peace and stability. After all, multilateralism is a process that views indivisibility of peace, and allows states of varying capabilities to have equal voice and equal responsibility in maintaining order. At this juncture in the Asia Pacific region, it may be the only way for both regional states and the US to instill influence, control, and predictability in each other's actions.

However, the ARF as a venue for multilateralizing security faces some uncertainties as regards its future. First, the ARF's long-term sustainability lies in its ability to find a common denominator for cooperation besides the interest in keeping the region stable. Second, its effectiveness will hinge on its ability to provide practical solutions to regional problems. Hence, while the ARF participants recognize the importance of comprehensive security, they must also identify issues that they can adequately address, and issues that can be placed under other international institutions. Moreover, the pace at which ARF is going through must be examined carefully. The ASEAN's proposal, and subsequently, ARF's decision to take an evolutionary and nonlegalistic approach might impede the development of concrete proposals. Finally, there has to be an institutionalized code of conduct that should serve as a framework for participants' interaction

in order to ensure that small states' interests be accommodated, and their bargaining power be not overshadowed by more powerful actors.

In conclusion, although the decline of extreme hegemony provides for a favorable context for states to cooperate, it is not sufficient for multilateralism to succeed. Multilateralism has to be institutionalized. Institutionalization can take place at two levels. The first is by adopting shared values and code of conduct which could constrain independent decision-making by concerned states. The second is the creation of a structure that would oversee the implementation of confidence-building measures (CBMs), gather information about existing conflicts in the region, and serve as repository of information from dialogues.

Notes

¹ For a discussion on the relationship between hegemony and regional economic multilateralism in the Asia Pacific, see Donald Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy," *World Politics* (July 1993).

² For elaboration on the concept of multilateralism, see John Gerald Ruggie, "The Anatomy of an Institution" in Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1993), p.14.

³ Barry Buzan quoted in Louise Fawcette and Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Regionalism in World Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.20

⁴ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992), pp. 36-37.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Defined as the mutual adjustment of states' policies to one another. See Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 31.

⁷ See Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrod, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions" in David A. Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 85-115.

⁸ Quoted from Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 35.

⁹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

¹⁰ See Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 45. However, Krasner and Gilpin forward another strand of argument contending that hegemonic power uses its superiority to pursue its own self-interest, and that may or may not also be to the advantage of subordinate actors. See Stephen Krasner, "State Power and Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* (April 1976), and Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 31. See also Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), and "Dominance and Leadership in International Political Economy," *International Studies Quarterly* (June 1981).

¹³ Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 343-352.

¹⁴ For a discussion on ZOPFAN, see Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 1987), pp. 56-58.

¹⁵ Felipe Miranda, et al. *Post-Aquino Philippines*, Draft Copy, Quezon City, Philippines: Social Weather Stations, 1992, p.31.

¹⁶ US Department of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 1995, p. 27.

¹⁷ Richard Cheney, "Six Principles of US Security Policy in Asia," *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 2-11.

¹⁸ *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, p.28.

¹⁹ See Chin Kin Wah, "ASEAN: External Security Concerns in the Post-Cold War Era," *The Roundtable* (1993), p.174.

²⁰ Desmond Ball, "Trends in Military Acquisition: Implications for Security Prospects for Constraints/Controls," *The Making of a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific* (Proceedings for the Seventh Asia Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 6-9 January 1993), p. 135.

²¹ *FBIS-EAS* (19 August 1991).

²² Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options," *Asian Survey* (May 1994), p. 439.

²³ Ball, pp. 135-137, and *Military Balance 1993-94*, p.148.

²⁴ See Chin, p.174.

²⁵ David Dewitt, "Commence, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in Asia Pacific," CAN CAPS Paper No. 3 (March 1994), pp. 9-10.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ During the 1991 ASEAN-PMC in Malaysia, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama forwarded that the ASEAN-PMC can be used as process for political discussions to improve security in the region.

²⁹ Jusuf Wanandi, "Peace and Security in Southeast Asia," Document No. 17 (Paper presented to the ASEAN and the Asia Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s, Manila, 5-7 June 1991).

³⁰ Rosemary Foot, "Pacific Asia; The Development of Regional Dialogue, in Fawcette and Hurrell, p. 242.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² President William J. Clinton's Remarks to the Korean National Assembly, Seoul, Korea, 10 July 1993.

³³ Chairman's Statement of the First Meeting of the ARF. Quoted from M.C. Casimiro-Ortuoste, "The ARF: Multilateralizing Security in the Asia-Pacific," *Kasarinlan* (2nd Quarter 1995), p.39.

³⁴ Dewitt, p.15.

³⁵ Ortuoste, p. 41.

